2 member of the Italian parliament elected in the 'Africa-Asia-Oceania-Antarctica' constituency hailed them as a form of 'global citizenship.' 3 Cosmopolitans, however, are more likely to approve of the general principle of extraterritorial voting rights than of the reasons why some individuals enjoy them and others do not. As Rainer Bauböck has noted, 4 extraterritorial voting rights are usually justified with reference to ethnicnationalist arguments, and states reserve them for 'nationals', i.e. people with a privileged legal status that is usually acquired through descent from another national and, less commonly, by being born in the state or through a naturalization procedure.
But what reasons would be more congenial to cosmopolitan sensibilities?
Cosmopolitans (and not only they) often believe that people who are significantly affected by a policy decision should have an opportunity to influence that decision. This 'all-affected principle' arguably requires the extension of participatory entitlements beyond the circle of resident and non-resident nationals, to include also those who are neither residents nor nationals but are nevertheless significantly affected by the policy decisions of the state.
However, it is also true that most residents are likely to be affected more directly and intensely by the decisions of any particular state than most non-residents. Despite growing global interdependence, jurisdictional boundaries still constrain the ability of a state to get hold of people and coerce them into obeying its laws and paying taxes.
Interpretations of the all-affected principle that are sensitive to differences in affectedness thus suggest that it would be wrong to grant participatory entitlements to non-residents on the same footing as residents. This creates a conundrum: if the allaffected principle is regarded as a valid basis for assigning participatory entitlements to individuals, how should those entitlements be distributed in a world where jurisdictional boundaries between states matter in determining patterns of affectedness -but only to some extent?
This article presents a solution to this conundrum. The solution is called 'fuzzy citizenship', and consists in an approach to the democratization of the global order that does not place direct constraints on what states can or should do (the 'output' side of state action) but changes the set of people to whom they owe participatory entitlements (the 'input' side). Fuzzy citizenship has the following key features: (a) it is based on territorial jurisdictions with authority over a broad or almost unlimited set of issuesmost importantly, on states as they exist today; (b) participatory entitlements with regard to the decision-making process of those jurisdictions are accorded to all those who are likely to be causally affected by any possible decision under any possible agenda, 5 rather than only to individuals with a privileged legal relationship to the jurisdiction (nationals) or those formally bound to comply with policy decisions because of their presence on the territory (residents); (c) participatory entitlements vary depending on the likelihood that decisions will have a significant impact on the interests of individuals; 6 (d) since the likelihood of significant impact can only be determined on the basis of the resources controlled by jurisdictions, rather than on the basis of the content of possible decisions, jurisdictions that control a larger stock of resources should be obliged to grant more say to extraterritorial voters than jurisdictions that control a smaller stock of resources. These features can be institutionally realized in a number of ways, the simplest of which is the following: the legislature of each state should grant voting power to representatives elected by all non-residents in proportion to the share of world income under the control of that state. While this is not the only institutional reform that could realize fuzzy citizenship, its relative simplicity makes it a useful point of reference for the discussion that follows. An important caveat is that this 5 This formulation of the all-affected principle stems from Robert Goodin and is discussed below in section III. Robert E. Goodin, 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives ', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35 (2007) , 40-68. 6 The fuzzy citizenship approach is therefore based on the proportionality principle: see Harry 4 article addresses only the desirability of this institutional innovation and does not discuss the conditions under which it may become politically feasible.
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The article is organized as follows. Section I presents the proposal in greater detail.
Section II justifies the proposal by showing how it addresses problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness in light of the all-affected principle. Section III compares fuzzy citizenship with other blueprints for global institutional reformworld federalism, global stakeholder democracy, and 'functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions' -and examines their relative ability to reduce overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.
II. DESCRIPTION OF FUZZY CITIZENSHIP
Over forty years ago, Robert Dahl examined the maxim 'Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that government'
and noted that, for all its problems, it 'is very likely the best general principle of inclusion that you are likely to find'. 8 Various issues and problems raised by Dahl in relation to that maxim have since been discussed and elaborated, and new arguments relating to the all-affected principle have been developed. However, one remark made by Dahl has generated little discussion: the all-affected interests principle 'forces us to ask whether there is not some wisdom in the half serious comment of a friend in Latin 6 attractive compared to the status quo, such an arrangement is unlikely to satisfy the allaffected principle.
The remainder of this section presents the basic features of a more extensive and intensive form of external representation -fuzzy citizenship -while the next section examines why and how those features can satisfy the all-affected principle under the conditions of partial and asymmetric interdependence that pervade the world today.
Fuzzy citizenship has five main features, which will be presented in turn.
1. Entities that owe participatory entitlements. In contrast to other proposals for global democratization that focus on specialized and nongovernmental organizations (see section IV), fuzzy citizenship applies primarily to decision-making units that combine two features: they are able to exercise effective authority over a territory in a way that is ultimately backed by coercive capabilities; and their authority applies to a
wide and possibly open-ended range of policy issues. A number of entities possess those features at least to some extent, notably provinces in federal states and the European Union. But they most clearly characterize states as we know them today.
Therefore, while the proposal may be extended to every multifunctional decisionmaking unit endowed with coercive authority, in the interest of simplicity the remainder of this article refers to 'states'.
Furthermore, I assume that within each state it is possible to identify an organ that has the twin function of taking fundamental decisions on how to use the authority of the state and of 'representing' those who are subject to that authority. While such organs have many different names, they are called 'legislatures' here. The following discussion skips over the diversity of ways in which legislative powers are exercised in existing states -e.g. bicameralism, the role of the executive in legislation, constitutional review of statutory legislation by the judiciary, and so on -and instead is based on a stylized account of how regulative and allocative policy decisions are made within state jurisdictions.
One question needs to be addressed now, however. the approach fruitful in a number of disciplines, such as mathematical logic, computer science, engineering, medicine, and the social sciences. 16 The basic idea can also be applied to normative and legal concepts such as citizenship. Thinking in terms of fuzzy sets is especially useful when observers of a certain property in a number of elements can identify one or two thresholds. There is a lower threshold when it makes sense to differentiate elements on the basis of the degree to which they possess that property when the value of the property is above that threshold but not when it is below.
Elements that are below the threshold can be all considered fully out the relevant set, whereas elements that are above the threshold are either partially or fully in the set.
Conversely, there is a higher threshold when it makes sense to differentiate elements on 14 This formula is based on Goodin, 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives'. fungible resources should be included in the calculation of extraterritorial participatory entitlements, since decisions on whether and how to convert them are likely to affect all non-subjects. This is because even if the current form of the resource cannot affect them, a 'converted' form probably would. By contrast, strictly nonfungible resources do not necessarily affect non-subjects, or affect only a subset of them, which suggests that their likely effect would need to be considered case by case. However, since the set of strictly non-fungible resources is small and possibly empty, this issue will not considered further here.
Considering that the set of fungible resources is very heterogeneous, how should the various categories be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the proportion of votes that states should assign to extraterritorial constituencies, i.e. to partial citizens?
instance, there was one parliamentary seat for every 76,171 eligible electors voting in Italy, and one parliamentary seat for every 225,615 eligible electors voting abroad (own calculations based on Ministero dell'Interno, Archivio storico delle elezioni, http://elezionistorico.interno.it).
As voter turnout was significantly higher in Italy than abroad, the difference between seats/voters ratios was substantially lower than the difference between seats/electors ratios.
19 I am grateful to Robert Goodin for highlighting important issue.
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Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to this question. One possible formula could be: S e /S j = (GDP j /GDP w )·(POP w -POP j )/POP w , where S e /S j is the ratio of extraterritorial seats over total seats in the legislature of state j, GDP j is the gross domestic product of j, GDP w is the world's gross domestic product, POP j is the population residing in j, and POP w is total world population. For illustration, the following table provides calculations for two large rich countries, a large poor country, a small rich country and a small poor country, in 2009 (data from World Development Indicators). although also in this case an argument about correlation between material and ideational resources could be made.
While the question of how to operationalize the principle of proportionality between resources and extraterritorial votes would inevitably be the subject to debate and contestation, the next section will argue that the principle itself is an appropriate way of realizing the all affected principle in a world of uneven interdependence.
21
5. Constitutional decisions. Decisions that concern the basic rules and functioning of the fuzzy citizenship regime require special procedures. These decisions include which resources should enter into the calculation of extraterritorial participatory entitlements, the formula according to which resources are translated into seats, and how to assess whether states have correctly applied the rules about extraterritorial representation.
Everyone in the world would be affected by such 'constitutional' decisions in equal degree, and hence everyone should have an equal chance to participate in taking them.
The most straightforward way of implementing this requirement is to create a global assembly whose members are either elected directly by citizens around the world or are chosen by state legislatures. Since such a body would be concerned only with settling constitutional questions and ensuring the proper functioning of the regime, it may convene only occasionally on the basis of need.
III. JUSTIFICATION OF FUZZY CITIZENSHIP
The introduction stated that fuzzy citizenship would provide a way of realizing the allaffected principle in a situation in which jurisdictional boundaries between states determine patterns of affectedness, but only to some extent. This section aims at substantiating this assertion. assume that the principle is about voting rights, although many of the arguments presented here also apply to an interpretation stressing the right to express views and concerns in the context of a deliberative process leading to a decision.
As noted above, recent discussions of the principle owe much to the influence of 
14
The all-affected principle is useful to the extent that it provides a general criterion for assessing existing and hypothetical institutional arrangements. In order to perform this function, the principle needs to be disaggregated into more specific criteria. A first relevant distinction is between the ability of institutional arrangements to reduce 'underinclusiveness' and their ability to reduce 'overinclusiveness'. Moreover, underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness can themselves be broken up into more specific concepts and criteria.
The likelihood that an institutional arrangement will be underinclusive depends to a significant extent on how the all-affected principle is understood. Goodin has probably provided the most expansive, and also most coherent and cogent, interpretation of the 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives'. For a discussion of the principle and further references to works that refer to it see Sofia Näsström, ' 
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(as opposed to possibly) be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda, reduces the expansionary implications of the all-affected principle. This is the interpretation adopted in this article.
29
The second type of overinclusiveness can be called 'relative' overinclusiveness. If absolute overinclusiveness occurs whenever someone not affected by a decision is allowed to take part in making it, relative overinclusiveness occurs whenever someone who is (probably) less affected by a decision is included in the same way and to the same extent as someone who is (probably) more affected by it. A way to express differences in the degree of affectedness is the notion of an individual's 'stake', which can be defined as 'the pay-off difference between the better option from the individual's perspective and the worse one' 30 Insofar as stakes as well as participation in decisionmaking are a matter of degree rather than a matter of all-or-nothing, absolute overinclusiveness is just a special case of relative overinclusiveness, namely a situation where the stake is 'zero' and participation is 'full'.
Relative overinclusiveness is related to what Dahl called the 'problem of intensity' in democratic theory, i.e. how to deal with situations in which a minority prefers an alternative much more 'passionately' than the majority prefers a different alternative.
Dahl suggested that the failure to take into account differences in intensity, especially in situations where minorities with intense preferences are systematically outvoted by majorities with weak preferences, contravenes the principle of equal consideration and 29 Goodin suggested that overinclusiveness may not be a cause for concern even if it were to occur. He points out that, if people are required to vote on some issue that does not affect their interests, they will randomly distribute themselves equally across all options, leaving the overall outcome unaltered. In other words, including people who are not affected will not change the content of the decision. While this may show that overinclusiveness may not be a problem in theory, it still represents a massive problem for the purposes of institutional design. Creating effective opportunities for people to participate in a decision involves costs, which would be wasted if participants were not affected by the outcome. Allowing everyone to take part in any 18 decision under any possible agenda of any state legislature. A critical advantage of fuzzy citizenship is that it would address relative overinclusiveness (and ipso facto absolute overinclusiveness). This is so because it is based on a dual set of differentiation criteria: one that differentiates between beneficiaries of participatory entitlements (people) and another that differentiates between the entities that owe such entitlements (states). These criteria will be considered in turn.
With regard to the first differentiation, fuzzy citizenship avoids relative overinclusiveness because it recognizes that there is normally an important difference in likely impact between those who are directly subjected to the coercion-backed authority of a state (generally because they reside within the jurisdictional boundaries of that state) and those that are affected by its decisions in other ways. As the former are equally 'subject' to the authority of the state, they should be entitled to equal and full citizenship in the state. In terms of fuzzy set logic, they pass an intensity threshold of affectedness beyond which any further difference is irrelevant. 33 People over whom the state has no authority find themselves in a different position: they may be more or less affected by it, but the mere fact of not being subjects of the state entitles them to less than full citizenship, i.e. partial citizenship.
34
Are there are reasons for differentiating further among those non-subjects and assign different degrees of partial citizenship to different categories of non-subject? Since their 33 In principle it could be argued that some residents are less 'subject' than others and therefore entitled to less than full citizenship. For instance, residents of a country X who have a guaranteed right to enter and settle in another country (e.g. because they are nationals of that country and left it voluntarily) might be seen as not being subject to the coercive authority of state X to the same degree as residents who do not have such a guaranteed entry and settlement right (e.g. because they are not nationals of any other state apart from X). The question is then whether better opportunities for 'exit' should result in weaker opportunities for 'voice'. Whether this or any other differentiation between residents would be justified under any circumstance is simply noted here as a question that may deserve further consideration.
34 Sofia Näsström has contrasted the all-affected principle with the 'all-subjected principle', according to which those subject to a rule should also be its authors. Näsström, 'The challenge of the all-affected principle'. In the fuzzy citizenship approach, 'being subject' is a special case of 'being affected' that justifies stronger but not exclusive claims to citizenship. affectedness has to be assessed in relation to any possible decision arising from any possible agenda, the answer is probably no: all non-subjects should be entitled to the same degree of partial citizenship. On the other hand, it could be argued that some nonsubjects are more affected by the decisions of a state whatever that decision might be, for instance because poverty or refugee status places them in a particularly vulnerable position. I will not pursuing this question further here, except to note that there might be some good reasons for distinguishing among non-subjects on the basis of general vulnerability.
35
With regard to the second differentiation mentioned above, the one relating to states, fuzzy citizenship reduces relative overinclusiveness because it does not impose the same participatory requirements on all states. As noted in the previous section, extraterritorial participatory entitlements should be proportional to the resources controlled by the state. Why this emphasis on resources? Recall the formulation of the all-affected proposed by Goodin: a say should be given to anyone who might probably be affected by any possible decision arising out of any possible agenda. In general, the impact of any decision depends on the content of the decision and on the resources that the decision-making unit could use to implement them. Of these two elements, the content of decisions cannot be used to determine who should have a say, because the content will probably depend on who has a say. Hence, the impact of decisions needs be determined solely on the basis of how many resources are at the disposal of the decision-making unit. 36 Non-subjects have a higher probability of being significantly affected by a more resourceful decision-making unit than by a less resourceful decisionmaking unit. Indeed, many decision-making units, including some states, do not possess sufficient resources to be likely to affect any non-subjects in a significant way, whether beneficially or harmfully. Those units may be required to offer weak or no participatory entitlements to non-subjects either if the former can affect the latter significantly but only with a very low probability or if they can affect them with high probability but 20 insignificantly. In sum, fuzzy citizenship reduces relative overinclusiveness by linking the extent of extraterritorial representation in states to the probability of them having a significant effect, via the resources they control.
37
In section II, a class of decisions was singled out as requiring a special procedure because of their 'constitutional' nature. These decisions concern the basic parameters and workings of the fuzzy citizenship regime. It was proposed to reserve these decisions to a special global assembly, whose members could be either elected by all citizens or chosen by all state legislatures. The justification for this special arrangement is that everyone would be affected by these decisions, and there is no reason to expect that some would be more affected than others. Since by design states do not offer equal opportunity for influence to everybody, those constitutional decisions need to be taken by an ad hoc body that offers such equal opportunities. It should be noted that this arrangement addresses an alleged difficulty of the all-affected principle, which is that the problem of defining democratically who is affected and therefore entitled to vote produces 'a regression from which no procedural escape is possible'. 38 The institutional solution proposed here does not lead to such an infinite regression: since everyone is equally affected by the basic rules of the fuzzy citizenship regime, everyone should have an equal opportunity to shape them.
37 Even a relatively weak state or non-state actor might have a significant impact on specific individuals when it concentrates its limited resources to uses that are detrimental to them. The best way to deal with this kind of situation is to create a system of obligations to provide ex post redress and compensation, not a duty to offer ex ante participation entitlements. 
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representatives allows for differences in preference intensity to be taken into account.
43
In sum, a range of political mechanisms can allow political actors to take into account variation in intensity even if this not required by 'constitutional' rules. 
Jurisdiction
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Two caveats should be noted. First, the authors of those models do not necessarily justify them with reference to some version of the all-affected principle, but may use different normative yardsticks. The aim of this section is not to assess how well the proposed institutions are likely to achieve goals set by their authors, but how and how well they would meet the assessment criteria outlined in the previous section. Second, the models have different approaches to the decision-making units that may or may not have to grant participatory entitlements. Some -notably global stakeholder democracy and fuzzy citizenship -aim mainly at 'democratizing' existing decision-making units.
The task is to add participatory mechanisms to those decision-making units. Othersnotably functional, overlapping and competing jurisdictions, and world federalism -aim at creating new decision-making units, which would incorporate democratic participatory mechanisms by design. non-members may refuse to join the scheme in order to avoid contributing to its cost.
FOCJ will be underinclusive whenever members are interested in externalizing costs and reject the inclusion of affected outsiders, and whenever outsiders are interested in benefiting from positive externalities and prefer not to join the FOCUS that produces them. This is partly due to the voluntary nature of FOCJ. But it also depends on the fact that FOCJ are functionally specific: since they specialize in the production of one type of good, various kinds of decisions are not likely to be on the agenda. This results in agenda-underinclusiveness. Members of a FOCUS have a say on how the resources it raises should be used to provide a good or service, rather than considering every possible use that could be made of those resources. Fuzzy citizenship is more effective at avoiding these problems of underinclusiveness, because full citizens do not have the right to exclude non-residents from (partial) citizenship, and the multifunctional nature of states means that full and partial citizens can decide to use the resources controlled by the state in any way they wish.
Furthermore, the absence of explicit mechanism for taking the preference intensity of members into account exposes FOCJ to the risk of relative overinclusiveness. Frey and Eichenberger acknowledge that the single-issue character of FOCJ means that intense preferences cannot be revealed through vote trading, but they argue that intense preferences can be accommodated in other ways. 45 First, members with intense preferences are more likely to participate in votes and elections for FOCJ positions, and their particularly intensive demands may be taken into account by other members. The problem with these informal mechanisms is that the likelihood of active participation 45 Frey and Eichenberger, New Democratic Federalism for Europe, 26 and the responsiveness of other members to one's demands are dependent not only on the intensity of preferences but also on a range of other factors, and the risk is that structurally disadvantaged members may become disenfranchised rather than empowered through them. Second, Frey and Eichenberger note that 'minorities with intensive preferences can establish a FOCUS designed to care for their special interests'.
However, in some cases such separate FOCJ would forfeit economies of scale in the production of collective goods, and as a result a FOCUS that is more responsive to people with certain interests may also be less able to satisfy them. Special FOCJ for people with intense preferences may also increase the risk of exposing minorities to the externalities produced by majorities, so that relative overinclusiveness is reduced at the cost of creating underinclusiveness. These problems are unlikely to emerge in a fuzzy citizenship regime, since it incorporates a basic rule for differentiating between more affected and less affected people and it does not hinder vote trading as a way of taking into account more fine-grained differences in affectedness. Federalism is vulnerable to these problems because it lacks some crucial features of fuzzy citizenship. Fuzzy citizenship reduces the problem of option-underinclusiveness deriving from extraterritorial externalities by overcoming the dichotomy of citizens who have a say and non-citizens who have no say at all. By assuming that all, or virtually all, choices about the use of scarce resources may have an extraterritorial effect and therefore give rise to extraterritorial participatory entitlements, fuzzy citizenship reduces underinclusiveness. Crucially, the fuzzy citizenship approach does not achieve this reduction in underinclusiveness at the cost of increasing relative overinclusiveness:
since it assumes that residents are normally affected more strongly than non-residents by the decisions of territorial authorities, it maintains that the former should have a different, and stronger, citizenship status than the latter. By abandoning the constraint that people have to be either citizens or non-citizens of any given governance unit, fuzzy citizenship can address option-underinclusiveness and relative overinclusiveness more effectively than federalism.
Fuzzy citizenship also solves the problem of agenda-underinclusiveness that creates difficulties for federalism: as indicated in section II, a fuzzy citizenship regime applies to multifunctional territorial units whose substantive agenda is not restricted, either by 31 federal rules of competence or by specialized mandates. Full and partial citizens participate in determining the agenda as well as in choosing options from that agenda.
While the substantive agenda of territorial units would not be restricted under a fuzzy citizenship regime, there would be some procedural restrictions: as noted above, the basic rules of a fuzzy citizenship regime would affect everybody equally, and thus they cannot be placed on the agenda of states, which offer unequal participatory entitlements.
The difference between federalism and fuzzy citizenship is that the former would assign to the 'global' level of authority a (potentially very wide) range of substantive competences in addition to procedural competences, whereas under fuzzy citizenship global institutions would focus on the procedural dimension. However, the fuzzy citizenship approach has important points of convergence with federalist approaches that emphasise the 'constitutive' and 'dispute-resolving' role of global representative institutions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In contrast to world federalism, fuzzy citizenship does not entail the creation of a global government with substantive competences. In contrast to global stakeholder democracy, fuzzy citizenship does not require the addition of mechanisms of stakeholder representation for thousands of non-state organizations that may affect people's ability to live autonomous lives. As proposals for reducing the global democratic deficit go, fuzzy citizenship could even be seen as requiring relatively modest institutional adjustments: as noted in the introduction, most states already allow non-residents to vote from abroad, and realizing the proposal would essentially entail dropping the requirement that those electors must be 'nationals' of the state.
Of course, matters are not so simple. Before any such institutional adjustments become conceivable, let alone feasible, a major conceptual adjustment is required:
citizenship must no longer be seen as an all-or-nothing affair. As noted above, the implementation of the fuzzy citizenship proposal would require a major conceptual shift in addition to major changes in norms and interests. It would be wrong to rule out the possibility of substantial conceptual innovations on the part of influential political entrepreneurs, and thus to condemn academic explorations into this unknown terrain as entirely futile. Shift happens. One prominent example must suffice. 66.
